Dr. Robert Beddor

Selected Publications

• “Inclusive Inquiry” (w. Finnur Dellsén), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming
• “Moral Justification”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, forthcoming
• Reliabilism and its Rivals, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Elements Series), forthcoming
• “Moorean Promises,” Ethics 135(3): 395-427, 2025
• “Unsettled Belief,” The Philosophical Quarterly 75(3): 834-857, 2025
• "Inquiry Beyond Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 109(1): 330-356, 2025
• "Prospects for Evidentialism," in Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence Routledge, 2024
• "Noncognitivism Without Expressivism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107(3): 726-788, 2023.
• "Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action," (w. Carlotta Pavese & Paul Henne), Ergo, 10(36): 1019-1056, 2023
• "Evidence, Justification and Truth,", Analysis, 83(3): 616-626, 2023
• "A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention," (w. Simon Goldstein), The Philosophical Quarterly 73(2): 46–378, 2023
• "Skills as Knowledge," (w. Carlotta Pavese), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 101(3): 609-624, 2023
• "Practical Knowledge Without Luminosity," (w. Carlotta Pavese), Mind 131(523):919-936, 2022
• "Shifty Evidence and Shifty Books,", Analysis 81 (2): 193-198, 2021
• "Reasons for Reliabilism," in Reasons, Justification, and Defeat Oxford University Press, 2021
• "Reliabilist Epistemology," (w. Alvin Goldman) in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021
• "Moral and Epistemic Evaluations: A Unified Treatment,", Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1): 23-49, 2021
• "Mighty Knowledge," (w. Simon Goldstein), The Journal of Philosophy 118 (5): 229-269, 2021
• "New Work for Certainty,", Philosophers’ Imprint 20 (8): 1-25, 2020
• "Certainty in Action,", The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281): 711-737, 2020
• "Fallibility for Expressivists,", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 763-777, 2020
• "A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem,", Philosophical Studies 177 (9): 2789-2813, 2020
• "Modal Virtue Epistemology," (w. Carlotta Pavese), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1): 61-79, 2020
• "Subjective Disagreement,", Noûs 53 (4): 819-851, 2019
• "The Toxin and the Dogmatist,", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 727-740, 2019
• "Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations,", Philosophers’ Imprint 19 (10): 1-27, 2019
• "Relativism and Expressivism," in Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Relativism Routledge, 2019
• "Might Do Better: Flexible Relativism and the QUD," (w. Andy Egan), Semantics and Pragmatics 11 (7): 1-43, 2018
• "Believing Epistemic Contradictions," (w. Simon Goldstein), Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (1): 87-114, 2018
• "Justification as Faultlessness,", Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 901-926, 2017
• "Process Reliabilism’s Troubles with Defeat,", The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 145-159, 2015
• "Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding,", Philosophical Studies 172 (7): 1847-1868, 2015