Robert Beddor, Ph.D.

Currently Teaching

• PHI 2010 Introduction to Philosophy
• PHI 5365 Epistemology

Office Hours (Spring)

• Thursdays 10:45am–12:45pm
• By appointment

Areas of Specialization

• Epistemology
• Philosophy of Language
• Metaethics

Curriculum Vitae

• CV 2024

Selected Publications

“Inclusive Inquiry” (w. Finnur Dellsén), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming
“Moral Justification”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, forthcoming
Reliabilism and its Rivals, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Elements Series), forthcoming
“Moorean Promises,” Ethics 135(3): 395-427, 2025
“Unsettled Belief,” The Philosophical Quarterly 75(3): 834-857, 2025
"Inquiry Beyond Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 109(1): 330-356, 2025
"Prospects for Evidentialism," in Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence Routledge, 2024
"Noncognitivism Without Expressivism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107(3): 726-788, 2023.
"Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action," (w. Carlotta Pavese & Paul Henne), Ergo, 10(36): 1019-1056, 2023
"Evidence, Justification and Truth,", Analysis, 83(3): 616-626, 2023
"A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention," (w. Simon Goldstein), The Philosophical Quarterly 73(2): 46–378, 2023
"Skills as Knowledge," (w. Carlotta Pavese), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 101(3): 609-624, 2023
"Practical Knowledge Without Luminosity," (w. Carlotta Pavese), Mind 131(523):919-936, 2022
"Shifty Evidence and Shifty Books,", Analysis 81 (2): 193-198, 2021
"Reasons for Reliabilism," in Reasons, Justification, and Defeat Oxford University Press, 2021
"Reliabilist Epistemology," (w. Alvin Goldman) in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021
"Moral and Epistemic Evaluations: A Unified Treatment,", Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1): 23-49, 2021
"Mighty Knowledge," (w. Simon Goldstein), The Journal of Philosophy 118 (5): 229-269, 2021
"New Work for Certainty,", Philosophers’ Imprint 20 (8): 1-25, 2020
"Certainty in Action,", The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281): 711-737, 2020
"Fallibility for Expressivists,", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 763-777, 2020
"A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem,", Philosophical Studies 177 (9): 2789-2813, 2020
"Modal Virtue Epistemology," (w. Carlotta Pavese), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1): 61-79, 2020
"Subjective Disagreement,", Noûs 53 (4): 819-851, 2019
"The Toxin and the Dogmatist,", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 727-740, 2019
"Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations,", Philosophers’ Imprint 19 (10): 1-27, 2019
"Relativism and Expressivism," in Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Relativism Routledge, 2019
"Might Do Better: Flexible Relativism and the QUD," (w. Andy Egan), Semantics and Pragmatics 11 (7): 1-43, 2018
"Believing Epistemic Contradictions," (w. Simon Goldstein), Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (1): 87-114, 2018
"Justification as Faultlessness,", Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 901-926, 2017
"Process Reliabilism’s Troubles with Defeat,", The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 145-159, 2015
"Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding,", Philosophical Studies 172 (7): 1847-1868, 2015