Oushinar Nath (oushinar.nath.17@ucl.ac.uk) University College London "Open-Mindedness and the Norm of Inquiry

According to the widely held Ignorance Norm of Inquiry (*I-Inquiry*), if an agent S knows an answer p^q to a question q at a time t, then S ought not to inquire into q at t. I cast doubt on *I-Inquiry* by discussing the nature of open-mindedness. I argue that open-mindedness is a type of inquiring attitude (IA). Now, a standard thought about IAs is that they entail ignorance – if someone is sincerely inquiring into q, then they do not know p^q. This, however, doesn't sit well with some of our intuitions about open-mindedness for, as I shall show, there are instances of open-mindedness where the agent knows p^q and yet is justified in inquiring further into q. Based on this, I motivate a new norm of inquiry.

Seth Goldwasser (SEG111@pitt.edu) University of Pittsburgh "Finding Normality in Abnormality: On the Ascription of Normal Functions to Cancer"

Cancer biology features the ascription of normal functions to parts of cancers. Normal functions are activities that parts of biological systems are, in some minimal sense, supposed to perform. In this paper, I argue that this poses difficulties for the two main approaches to normal function in the philosophy of biology. One approach claims that normal functions are activities that the function-bearing part of a biological system is selected to perform. I identify these with selected effects accounts. The problem with these accounts is that at least some parts of cancers that have normal functions but are not selected to perform those functions. The other approach claims that normal functions are activities by which the function-bearing part typically contributes to the survival or reproduction of the system. Following Garson (2016), I call these "fitnesscontribution accounts." The problem with these accounts is that cancers are not uniform in the way required to establish what is typical for a type. The failure of both approaches leaves open a gap in the literature on function in the philosophy of biology. While I do not pursue filling the gap in this paper, I suggest that the reason cancer biologists ascribe normal functions to parts of cancers is ultimately practical and therapeutic. Ascribing these functions identifies a standard of part activity that targeted treatment can flout. I believe this, in turn, requires modeling the mechanisms involved in disease progression and that normal functions are ascribed as part of the modeling process.

Maria Gallego-Ortiz (maria.gallego.2@bc.edu) Boston College "Making Sense of *Akrasia* in Plato's *Protagroas*"

The aim of this paper is to analyze why according to Socrates in Plato's Protagoras the phenomenon of akrasia occurs. Against some interpreters who argue that Socrates denies the possibility of akrasia because he identifies virtue with knowledge, i.e. if you know what is the right action to do then it would be impossible to be overcome by pleasure, I argue that for Socrates akrasia is possible because

what is overcome by pleasure is not knowledge but something we think to be knowledge. In this analysis I follow Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, and Agnes Callard, who argue that in the phenomenon of akrasia we are dealing with other mental states, such as non-rational desires and appearances. This will lead us then to claim that for Socrates knowledge gets a different meaning here. It does not refer exclusively to perfect rational knowledge, rather it has to deal with desires and appearances of the good. To develop the argument, I divide this paper in two sections. The first one presents how Socrates describes the phenomenon of akrasia in Protagoras. There we will find why knowledge understood as perfect rational knowledge is not what is overcome by pleasure or pain. The second section, then, addresses the interpretations of Brickhouse and Smith, and Callard, and will show what we are really dealing with in the phenomenon of akrasia. I hope this exposition aids in the endeavor of making sense of akrasia.

Sumeet Patwardhan (sumeetcp@umich.edu) University of Michigan – Ann Arbor "Do I Have To?" Moral Ignorance and Sexual Consent

Suppose that someone tries to guilt-trip their spouse into believing that consenting to sex is a marital duty. Their deception succeeds; their spouse consents; the two have sex. Is that sex nonconsensual? More generally, can ignorance of a sexual activity's moral features prevent valid consent? In this paper, I answer both questions: yes. We all know that ignorance (including false belief) about non-moral features of a sexual activity can prevent valid consent. For example, if someone deceives you into sex by making you believe that they don't have an STD, your consent is not valid. But every non-question-begging conception of this common knowledge, I argue, implies that moral ignorance can also prevent valid consent. This result faces objections from two sources. First, some of the literature on whether moral ignorance is exculpatory claims that moral knowledge is easily accessible to everyone. Second, some of the literature on moral testimony argues that relying on others' moral testimony is neither rational nor morally justifiable. These alleged asymmetries might lead one to think: it's a consenter's responsibility to learn the moral facts themselves, so if they don't, we should still take them to have made a valid consent decision – albeit a bad consent decision. Accordingly, the rest of my paper argues that these asymmetries, even if true, do not undermine my conclusion. Namely, there is indeed a symmetry between moral and non-moral ignorance with respect to their ability to prevent valid sexual consent. This symmetry, I conclude, is novel, surprising, and useful. Novel, because the consent literature has not discussed the relationship between moral ignorance and valid consent. Surprising, because defending this symmetry is not an uncontroversial 'extension' of the literature on non-moral ignorance and consent, as it may initially seem. Useful, because this symmetry illuminates undertheorized cases of nonconsensual sex.

Steve Chan (cshoi3168@gmail.com) University of Houston "Do Application Conditions for 'K' Include that Ks Exist?: Easy Ontology, Perceptual Input and Hallucination"

According to Thomasson's easy ontology, a cup exists as long as there are particles arranged cupwise because the application condition for the noun term 'cup' is that there are particles arranged cupwise. She argues we do not need a substantive criterion for existence like composition, mind-independence or being a joint-carver. Against Thomasson, there is a basic existence challenge (or a problem of regress or circularity) that we cannot give application condition(s) for more basic terms (e.g., 'particles') except in terms of the existence of the entities in question. This paper contributes to this debate by arguing against a response by Thomasson, which I call the 'perceptual input strategy'. The strategy is to argue that utterers are correct in claiming objects exist insofar as they have the relevant

"[perceptual] inputs [such] as spatiotemporal continuity, boundedness, and cohesiveness" (p. 110). I argue one's perceptual inputs can mismatch reality, e.g., when one is hallucinating. Furthermore, our intuition that perceptual inputs can mismatch reality informs us about our concept of 'object' in ordinary English. As Thomasson appeals to the preservation of ordinary English in her arguments for easy ontology, this appeal backfires Thomasson since Thomasson is arguing for a counterintuitive concept of 'object'.

Russell Ming (grming@uci.edu) UC Irvine "The Problem of Warranted Objections: Assertion, Disagreement, and Knowledge Norms"

What should we do when we find ourselves in a disagreement with an epistemic peer? One of the most popular views in the literature says that both agents should suspend their beliefs, even if one of the agents happened to reason correctly. Why? The thought is that the evidence of peer disagreement defeats the justificatory status of both agents' beliefs. What is the norm governing assertion? One of the most popular views in the literature says that one should only assert what one knows. Proponents appeal to a number of considerations which purport to favor their view, such as lottery propositions, Moorean sentences, and conversational patterns. Now, imagine a disagreement interaction, consisting of three different stages: at stage (I), A believes p and B believe not-p, and each believes the other to be equally reliable and well-informed; at stage (II), A asserts p; at stage (III), B object to A's assertion by asserting not-p. What I will argue is that if one is committed to both the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) and Conciliationism about disagreement, then, in cases where B has reasoned correctly, one is committed to the claim that at stage (III) B has warrant to object and B does not have warrant to object. I call this the Problem of Warranted Objections. After showing why the Problem of Warranted Objections falls directly out of KNA and Conciliationism, I note three ways of responding to the problem.